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8: Reducing the Impacts of Drought: Progress Toward 
Risk Management 
DONALD A. WILHITE 
INTRODUCTION 
Images of malnutrition, famine and a degraded African 
landscape were commonplace during the 1980s and appear 
likely to continue well into the 1990s and beyond. Glantz 
(1987) has shown that drought has hindered the ability of 
much of sub-Saharan Africa to achieve a sustained level of 
agricultural production and, as a result, has retarded 
progress toward economic development. Linkages between 
drought and economic development, although most obvious 
in Africa, exist throughout much of the developing world. 
The impacts of drought in developed countries differ 
substantially from those experienced in much of the develop-
ing world. Absent are the widespread occurrences of food 
shortages, which may lead to malnutrition and famine, and 
large-scale evidence of land degradation. However, econ-
omic costs, particularly in the agricultural, energy and 
transportation sectors, are substantial. The recent droughts 
in the United States and Canada have been stark reminders 
of the vulnerability of all nations to this extreme climatic 
event. This increased awareness of the economic, social and 
environmental costs of drought is leading a growing number 
of nations, both developed and developing, to seek a more 
proactive approach to drought management. These nations 
now realize that they can no longer afford to divert scarce 
financial resources to drought relief programs that do little to 
reduce, and may actually increase, vulnerability to subse-
quent periods of water shortage. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a case study of the 
recent progress that has been made by some countries in 
reducing their vulnerability to drought. Progress toward 
drought preparedness will be discussed for the United States 
of America, South Africa, and Australia. Although many 
countries have made significant progress in this area in recent 
years, these countries were chosen because of what is con-
sidered dramatic philosophical changes in the way drought 
and its management are perceived by government. The intent 
is for other drought-prone regions to examine these 
approaches and consider adapting them to their particular 
social, political and environmental setting. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first will 
present an overview of drought and drought planning that 
will serve as background information for later discussions of 
recent drought policy and program changes in the United 
States, Australia and South Africa, all discussed in the 
second section. The final section provides a brief description 
of a generic planning process that is being promoted as one 
method of developing comprehensive preparedness plans for 
dealing with future episodes of drought. 
DROUGHT OVERVIEW 
Drought as a natural hazard 
Drought differs from other natural hazards (such as floods, 
hurricanes and earthquakes) in several ways. First, since the 
effects of drought accumulate slowly over a considerable 
period of time, and may linger for years after the termination 
of the event, a drought's onset and end are difficult to 
determine. Because of this, drought is often referred to as a 
'creeping phenomenon.' Second, the absence of a precise and 
universally accepted definition of drought adds to the confu-
sion about whether or not a drought exists and, if it does, its 
severity. Third, drought impacts are less obvious and are 
spread over a larger geographical area than is damage that 
results from other natural hazards. Drought seldom results 
in structural damage. For these reasons the quantification of 
impacts and the provision of disaster relief are far more 
difficult tasks for drought than they are for other natural 
hazards. 
Although drought represents a considerable climatic risk 
in semi-arid regions, it is a normal part of the climate for 
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virtually all climatic regimes. Drought differs from aridity 
since the latter is restricted to low-rainfall regions and is a 
permanent feature of climate. The character of drought is 
distinctly regional, reflecting unique meteorological, hydro-
logical and socioeconomic characteristics. Many people 
associate the occurrence of drought with the Great Plains of 
North America, Africa's Sahelian region, India or Australia; 
they may have difficulty visualizing drought in Southeast 
Asia, Brazil, Western Europe or the eastern United States, 
regions perceived by many to have a surplus of water. 
Drought should be considered relative to some long-term 
average condition of balance between precipitation and 
evapotranspiration in a particular area, a condition often 
perceived as 'normal' (Wilhite and Glantz 1985). It is the 
consequence of a natural reduction in the amount of precipi-
tation received over an extended period of time, usually a 
season or more in length" although other climatic factors 
(such as high temperatures, high winds and low relative 
humidity) are often associated with it in many regions of the 
world and can significantly aggravate the severity of the 
event. Drought is also related to the timing (i.e. principal 
season of occurrence, delays in the start of the rainy season, 
occurrence of rains in relation to principal crop growth 
stages) and the effectiveness of the rains (i.e. rainfall inten-
sity, number of rainfall events). 
Responding to drought: a historical perspective 
Governments have traditionally relied on a wide range of 
potential actions to deal with the impacts of water shortages 
on people and various economic sectors. In the United 
States, agencies of the federal government and both houses 
of Congress typically respond by making massive amounts of 
relief available to the affected areas. This generally takes the 
form of short-term emergency measures to agricultural pro-
ducers, such as feed assistance for livestock, drilling of new 
wells and low-interest farm operating loans. In the section 
below, the primary features of drought policy in the United 
States and Australia are compared. In addition, the 
approaches taken historically by Brazil and India are des-
cribed briefly. 
United States and Australia 
Wilhite (1986) compared drought policy in the United States 
and Australia to learn more about the approaches taken by 
two drought-prone nations to deal with the effects of 
drought. For that study, the principal features of drought 
policy were grouped into three categories: organizational, 
response and evaluation (see Table 1). 
Organizational features are planning activities that 
provide timely and reliable assessments, such as a drought 
early-warning system, and procedures for a coordinated and 
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efficient response, such as drought declaration and revo-
cation. These characteristics would be the foundation of a 
provincial, regional or national drought plan. Response 
features refer to assistance measures and associated adminis-
trative procedures that are in place to assist individual 
citizens or businesses experiencing economic and physical 
hardship because of drought. 
Numerous assistance measures are available in the United 
States but few are intended specifically for drought. Table 2 
lists the federal assistance programs used in the United States 
during the 1976-7 drought. Until recently, relief arrange-
ments in Australia were included, for the most part, under 
the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangement agreements. These 
are now in the process of being discontinued as part of a 
proposed new national drought policy that will be discussed 
in a later section of this paper. Reliefmeasures, by state, used 
during the 1982-3 severe drought in Australia are illustrated 
in Table 3. 
Evaluation of organizational procedures and drought 
assistance measures in the post-drought recovery period is 
the third category of drought policy features. It is critical that 
governmental response efforts be evaluated during the post-
drought period in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes 
during subsequent droughts. This evaluation is best accom-
plished by a nongovernmental organization, such as a 
university or private research group, that will be unbiased in 
its assessment. In Australia, governments have been more 
conscientious in their evaluation of drought response efforts. 
In the United States, the federal government has not routi-
nely evaluated the performance of response-related pro-
cedures or drought assistance measures. Aspects of the 1976-
7 drought were evaluated by the General Accounting Office 
(1979) and Wilhite et al. (1986). Responses to the 1987-9 
droughts were examined by Riebsame et al. (1990). 
Brazil 
The most drought-prone region of Brazil is in the Northeast, 
often referred to as the 'drought polygon.' This region has a 
long history of drought, and the government has followed a 
variety of approaches to the problem, dating back to the 
Imperial Inquiry Commission that responded to the drought 
of 1877-9. One of the positive steps taken early to deal with 
the problem was the creation of the Department of Works to 
Overcome Drought (DNOCS) in 1909 (Pessoa 1987). Its 
purpose was to collect basic information about the region, 
including technical-scientific studies and maps, and to estab-
lish a meteorological and hydrological network for monitor-
ing climate and water resources. In the 1960s, the Superinten-
dency for Northeast Development (SUDENE) was created 
to expand existing monitoring networks, conduct hydrogeo-
logical research and integrated studies of potential natural 
resources, and map soil and mineral resources. 
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Table 1. Comparison of drought policy features as of 1984: United States and Australia 
Features 
Organization 
National drought plan 
State drought plans 
United States Australia 
None Study in progess 
In selected states 
National drought early-warning system 
Agricultural impact assessment 
Joint USDA/NOAA Weather Facility 
Available, but generally unreliable 
Through NDRA agreements 
Bureau of Meteorology 
Not available 
techniques 
Federal 
County 
State 
Unit varies between states 
Responsibility for drought declaration 
Geographic unit of designation 
Declaration procedures Standard for all states; varies by 
program/agency 
Varies between states; standard within 
states 
Response 
State fiscal responsibility for assistance 
measures 
Negligible, if any 
State administrative responsibility for 
assistance measures 
No responsibility for federal measures 
Defined by NDRA agreements up to 
base amounts; varies by state 
Defined by NDRA agreements and by 
federal measures 
Eligibility requirements and provisions 
of drought assistance measures 
Standard within programs for all 
designated counties 
Varies by state for NDRA core 
measures; standard for federal 
programs 
National crop insurance program All-risk federal program Rainfall insurance feasibility study in 
progress 
Evaluation 
Post-drought documentation and 
evaluation of procedures and 
measures 
No routine evaluation by government Routine evaluation by federal and state 
governments 
Source: NDRA, National Disaster Relief Arrangements; USDA/NOAA, US Department of Agriculture/National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration. 
In spite of the long history of actions taken to respond to 
drought in Northeast Brazil, the severe drought of 1979-83 
found the region even more vulnerable to water shortages 
(Pessoa 1987). As a result, in 1985 the Civil Defense Plan was 
developed under the leadership of SUD ENE to address both 
drought and flood problems. The purpose of the plan was to 
reduce the risks and impacts to the population and provide 
aid as necessary. The plan also triggers a drought watch 
system that produces more detailed climatological analyses 
and advisories. 
Assistance programs have been of two types (Pessoa 1987). 
First, rural credit, water supply and food distribution pro-
grams are expanded to meet the needs of the distressed area. 
Second, public works projects are initiated to employ rural 
refugees in a variety of tasks, including: 
• building water structures; 
• transporting water supplies via tank trucks; 
• providing reasonably priced staple food items; 
• distributing food to ease social tension; 
• planting trees; 
• distributing fodder; 
• supplying seeds; 
• supporting small irrigation operations; 
• distributing construction equipment; 
• supporting literacy programs. 
As a result of continuing problems in responding effecti-
vely to drought in the region, the government supported the 
conduct of a regional training seminar on drought manage-
ment and preparedness in which the University of Nebras-
ka's International Drought Information Center was one of 
the organizers and participants. As a result of this seminar, 
FUCEME (the State Meteorological Foundation of Ceara) 
is leading an effort aimed at enhancing regional coordination 
on drought planning. 
India 
Drought and famine mitigation efforts have had a long 
history in India, beginning with the adoption of 'famine 
codes' by several provincial governments in 1883 (Sinha et al. 
1987). In 1975, the 'Drought Code' and 'Good Weather 
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Table 2. Drought-relatedJederal assistance programs used to respond to the 1976-7 drought in the United States, by agency 
Agency 
Department of Agriculture 
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA] 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) 
Federal Crop Insurance Corp (FCIC) 
Forest Service (FS) 
Soil Conservation Service (SCS) 
Department of the Interior 
Bureau of Reclamation (BuRec) 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
Southwest Power Administration 
Economic Development Administration (EDA), Department of 
Commerce 
Small Business Administration (SBA) 
Federal Disaster Assistance Administation (FDAA) , 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 
Federal Power Commission/Federal Energy Administration 
(FPC/FEA) 
Employment and Training Administation (ETA), Department 
of Labor 
General Services Administration (GSA) 
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) 
Department of Defense 
Note: " Programs in the White House drought package. 
Source: WESTPO (1977). 
Program name 
Emergency Loans" 
Emergency Livestock Loans 
Farm Operating Loans 
Farm Ownership Loans 
Soil and Water Loans 
Irrigation and Drainage Loans 
Community Program Loans 
Emergency Conservation Measures 
Emergency Livestock Feed 
Agricultural Conservation" 
Disaster Payments 
Federal Crop Insurance" 
Cooperative Forest Fire Control 
Cooperative Forest Insect and Disease Management 
Rural Community Fire Protection 
Drought-Related Stewardship 
Great Plains Conservation 
Resource Development and Conservation 
Conservation Technical Assistance 
Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention 
Emergency Fund 
Drought Emergency" 
Drought-Related Technical Assistance 
Grazing Privilege 
Drought-Related Stewardship 
Drought-Related Stewardship 
Emergency Electric Service" 
Community Emergency Drought Relief 
Economic Adjustment 
Public Works Impact Projects 
Emergency Drought Disaster Loans" 
Physical Disaster Loans 
Economic Injury Disaster Loans 
Disaster Assistance (Hay Transportation, Cattle 
Transportation, Emergency Livestock Feed, Forest Fire 
Suppression) 
Drought-Related Services and Activities 
Unemployment Insurance Grants to States 
Farm Workers 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Programs (CET A) 
Employment Services 
Donation of Federal Surplus Personal Property 
Sale of Federal Surplus Personal Property 
Civil Defense-Federal Surplus Personal Property Donations 
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Table 3. Drought relief measures available in Australia under the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements, by state, as of 
March 1983 
Measure 
Concessionalloans 
Carry-on loans to primary producers 
Restocking loans to primary producers 
Loans for purchase of fodder 
Loans for supply of water 
Carry-on loans for small business 
Loans to cereal growers 
Freight concessions 
Stock movement 
Fodder 
Water to primary producers 
Water to state, local or semigovernment 
authorities 
Machinery and equipment 
Stock slaughter subsidy for primary producers 
Stock disposal subsidy to local, state and 
semigovernment authorities 
Other subsidies 
Water 
Agistment 
Other 
Notes: 
New 
South South Western Northern 
Wales Victoria Queensland Australia Australia Tasmania Territory 
* * * * * * * 
(Maximum amount ranges from $20000 to $40000, with interest at 4%. 
Repayment period generally 7 years with discretional repayment holiday of 1-3 
years in some cases.) 
* (I) * (1) (2) (1) NA 
(Maximum amount ranges from $20000 to $30000, repayable over 7-10 years, 
at 4--5% interest rate.) 
* NA NA NA NA NA NA 
(Loans to dairy companies, repayable over 5 years, at 4% interest rate.) 
NA NA (2) NA NA NA NA 
(80% of cost to local authorities for augmentation of town water supplies. 
Repayable over 7-9 years at 3-4% interest rate.) 
NA * (2) * * NA NA 
(Maximum amount of $40000, repayable over 7-10 years at 4% interest rate.) 
(2) NA NA NA (2) NA NA 
* * * * * NA * 
(Applies to rail and road at 75%.) 
* * * * NA * 
(Applies to rail and road, generally at 50-75% concession.) 
* * * * NA NA NA 
(Applies to private vehicle, generally at 75% concession.) 
NA * * * * NA NA 
NA NA (2) NA NA NA NA 
(2) NA (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
(Generally $10-15 per head for cattle and $1-3 per head for sheep.) 
* * * * * NA NA 
(Generally $1 per head for cattle and 15 cents per head for sheep.) 
* * (2) * (2) NA NA 
(Generally applies to drilling wells for towns or stock water at 75-100% 
concession.) 
NA (2) (2) NA (2) (2) NA 
(Rate of $1.00--1.75 per head of cattle and 10--12.5 cents per head for sheep and/ 
or 50--75% of cost of adjustment.) 
NA (2) (2) NA (2) NA NA 
*, included in core measures; NA, not available; (1), included in carry-on loans; (2), available but not part of core measures. 
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Code' were adopted. The Drought Code is anticipatory, 
providing a list of alternative cropping strategies that should 
be adopted when there is evidence of drought. These include 
anticipating conditions of food scarcity early in the season, 
maximizing production and alternating cropping patterns in 
irrigated areas, making mid-season corrections in crop plant-
ing in unirrigated areas, and building up seed and fertilizer 
buffers to implement the drought coping strategy. The Good 
Weather Code outlines the scientific, administrative and 
planning steps necessary to take full advantage of a good 
monsoon season to increase production of food grains. The 
Drought Watch group exists at the national level, made up of 
representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, Meteorology 
Department, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, and 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, to monitor 
weather conditions throughout the country. This group 
receives regular reports from similar groups at the state and 
district levels. 
The strategies currently being used by the Indian govern-
ment to reduce vulnerability are a combination of emergency 
and long-term programs. These tactics include early mon-
soon forecasts; improved communication systems; provision 
of resources such as credit, fertilizers, pesticides, and power 
for increasing production; assistance to farmers in poor 
monsoon years; maintenance of adequate prices; mainten-
ance of reasonable buffer stocks of food grains in strategic 
locations; and improved transportation systems (Sinha et al. 
1987). The government has also undertaken a nationwide 
satellite monitoring program to provide early warning of the 
potential impacts of drought on agricultural production 
(Thiruvengadachari 1991). Evidence would seem to indicate 
that the drought-prone areas of India are less vulnerable to 
drought today than they were several decades ago because of 
the country's maintenance of buffer stocks of food for 
distribution during times of shortage (A. R. Subbiah, 
personal communication). 
The Agro-Meteorology Service of India is striving to 
improve weather predictions, prepare climatological infor-
mation for agricultural decision making, develop delivery 
systems to provide timely collection and distribution of data 
and information to users, and develop advisories on agricul-
tural operations for contingency cropping practices during 
drought. 
RECENT PROGRESS IN DROUGHT 
PREP AREDNESS 
Governments worldwide have shown increased interest in 
drought planning since the early 1980s. Several factors have 
contributed to this interest. First, the widespread occurrence 
of severe drought over the past several decades and, specifi-
cally, the years during and following the extreme ENSO 
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event of 1982-3 focused attention on the vulnerability of all 
nations to drought. Second, the costs associated with 
drought are now better understood by some governments. 
These costs include not only the direct impacts of drought 
but also the indirect costs (i .e. personal hardship, the costs of 
response programs, retardation of economic development 
and accelerated environmental degradation). Nations can no 
longer afford to allocate scarce financial resources to short-
sighted response programs that do nothing to mitigate the 
effects of future droughts. Finally, the intensity and fre-
quency of extreme meteorological events such as drought 
may increase, given projected changes in climate associated 
with increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide and other 
atmospheric trace gases. Droughts are a climatic certainty 
and recent events worldwide have highlighted the import-
ance of preparing now for future episodes. From an institu-
tional point of view, learning today to deal more effectively 
with climatic events such as drought may serve us well in 
preparing proper response strategies to long-term climate-
related issues. 
Global concern exists within the scientific and policy 
communities about the inability of governments to respond 
to drought in an effective and timely manner. In the past 
decade, numerous 'calls for action' for improved drought 
planning and management have been issued by national 
governments, professional organizations, international 
organizations, and others. The challenge of changing the 
perception of policy makers and scientists worldwide about 
drought is a formidable one. The typical mode of operation 
for government in dealing with natural hazards is crisis 
management. It is indeed a difficult task for government to 
engage in long-range planning. However, the progress cur-
rently being made in planning for future drought demon-
strates a new awareness and improved understanding of 
drought and its economic, social and environmental impacts. 
United States 
In the past decade, droughts have been a prevalent feature of 
the American landscape. These droughts have resulted in 
significant impacts in a myriad of sectors, including agricul-
ture, transportation, energy, recreation and health; they have 
also had adverse environmental consequences. In society's 
attempt to cope with the effects of these extended periods of 
water shortage in recent years, the inadequacy of federal 
contingency planning efforts has been confirmed once again. 
The inability of the United States government to respond 
effectively has also illustrated the inflexibility of existing 
water management systems and policies as well as the lack of 
coordination between and within levels of government. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that the impacts of 
both short-term and multi-year drought in the United States 
have been aggravated by poorly conceived or nonexistent 
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assessment and response efforts by governments. These 
efforts have been characterized as largely ineffective, poorly 
coordinated, and untimely (General Accounting Office 1979; 
Wilhite et al. 1986; Wilhite and Easterling 1987). As a result, 
there have been numerous 'calls for action' by regional and 
national organizations for the development of a national 
drought policy to coordinate federal response to drought. 
These calls include recommendations from the Western 
Governors' Policy Office (1978), General Accounting Office 
(1979), National Academy of Sciences (1986), Interstate 
Conference on Water Policy (1987), Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (Smith and Tirpak 1989), Great Lakes Commis-
sion (1990), and the American Meteorological Society 
(Orville 1990). The call from the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has come about as a result of the concern that 
exists about a possible increase in the frequency and severity 
of extreme events in association with projected changes in 
climate because of increasing concentrations of atmospheric 
trace gases. 
Despite the numerous calls for the development of a 
national drought policy and plan, the federal government 
has not acted on these recommendations. The primary 
reason for the lack of progress by federal agencies seems to be 
the unique character and multidisciplinary nature of drought 
and the cross-cutting responsibilities of federal agencies for 
drought assessment and response programs. Clearly, a single 
federal agency must take the lead in coordinating the devel-
opment of a national plan. It is less clear which federal 
agency should assume this responsibility. In the final analy-
sis, it may take an executive order to initiate the process at 
this level. In the meantime, progress in drought management 
at the federal level has been sluggish and agency-specific (e.g. 
Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation). 
Because of the factors mentioned above and an apparent 
lack of appreciation by federal agencies of the complexity 
and seriousness of drought management issues faced by 
states, it became clear to many states during the mid-1980s 
that progress toward a higher level of preparedness would be 
achieved only if they took the lead. Historically, state govern-
ments have played a passive role in governmental efforts to 
assess and respond to drought. During the widespread and 
severe drought of 1976-7, for example, no state had prepared 
a formal drought response strategy. In 1982, only three states 
had developed plans: South Dakota, New York and Color-
ado. Generally speaking, states have relied on the federal 
government to come to their rescue when water shortages 
reach near-disaster proportions by providing relief to 
drought victims. 
At present, 23 states have prepared some type of formal 
drought contingency plan (Wilhite 1991a). The pattern of 
states with drought plans is illustrated in Fig. I. This pattern 
is complex and can be only partially explained on the basis of 
the climatology of drought. Impediments to plan develop-
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ment were discussed earlier in the chapter. However, each 
state's decision to develop (or not to develop) a drought plan 
is based on specific climatological, political, economic and 
demographic factors. An analysis of the relative importance 
of these factors has been completed but will not be discussed 
here (Wilhite and Rhodes 1994). For those states that have 
developed plans, planning efforts have often been conducted 
in conjunction with an overall water management planning 
initiative. Clearly, states can now be labelled policy innova-
tors in drought planning. 
An examination of existing state drought plans reveals 
that they have certain key elements in common. Administra-
tively, a task force is responsible for the operation of the 
system and is directly accountable to the governor. The task 
force keeps the governor advised of water availability and 
potential problem areas; it also recommends policy options 
for consideration. Operationally, drought plans have three 
features in common. First, a water availability committee 
continuously monitors water conditions and prepares out-
looks a month or season in advance. Since most of the 
information necessary to monitor water conditions compre-
hensively (i.e. precipitation and temperature, streamflow, 
groundwater levels, snowpack, soil moisture, meteorological 
forecasts) is available from state or federal agencies, the 
primary role of the committee is to coordinate the collection 
and analysis of this information and the delivery of products 
to decision makers on a timely basis. The committee assimi-
lates this information and issues timely reports and recom-
mendations. Second, a formal mechanism usually exists to 
assess the potential impacts of water shortages on the most 
important economic sectors. In some states this task is 
accomplished by a single committee or, more commonly, 
separate working groups are established to address each 
sector. Third, a committee or the task force referred to 
previously considers current and potential impacts and 
recommends response options to the governor. 
Although many of the mitigative programs implemented 
by states during recent droughts can be characterized as 
emergency actions taken to alleviate the crisis at hand, these 
actions were often quite successful. As states gain more 
experience assessing and responding to drought, future 
actions will undoubtedly become more timely and effective. 
State drought preparedness plans will become broader in 
scope, addressing a wider range of potential mitigative 
actions, including more meaningful levels of intergovern-
mental coordination. In time this will help states avoid or 
reduce the impacts, conflicts and personal hardships asso-
ciated with drought. To be successful, these plans should be 
integrated with local, regional and national plans, if they 
exist. 
Fortunately, many resources are now available to assist 
governments in the drought planning process. The existence 
of model plans (Western States Water Council 1987; Wilhite 
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_ States developing plans 
Figure 1: States in the contiguous United States with drought plans, as of 1991. (Alaska and Hawaii have not prepared drought plans.) 
1990) and 23 state plans provide a critical reference for states 
desiring to develop a plan or revise an existing plan. In 
addition, several regional organizations have considerable 
experience in drought planning and can assist states in plan 
development (e.g. Delaware River Basin Commission, Great 
Lakes Commission, Western Governors' Association). 
South Africa 
Actions taken by the South African government in response 
to droughts have typically been poorly coordinated and 
assistance programs have been largely ineffective (c. R. 
Baard, personal communication 1985). According to Baard, 
the government has had difficulty assessing drought impact 
and making subsequent declarations, and no routine com-
prehensive evaluation of government drought policy and 
response efforts has been completed. 
For many decades, drought assistance programs in South 
Africa concentrated mainly on providing relief to the live-
stock industry, with little attention to crop farming, either 
dryland or irrigated (Wilhite 1987). The rationale behind this 
emphasis on the livestock industry in South Africa has been 
that 85% of all agricultural land in the country remains 
under native pastures, most of which lie in the dry zones of 
the western and northwestern part of the country. The 
incidence of drought in these drier zones is about one year in 
three. Only 15% of South Africa receives precipitation in 
excess of 500 millimeters per year. A serious drought that 
began in 1978 and affected, to varying degrees, 75% of South 
Africa resulted in significant expenditures by the government 
for drought relief. For example, during the 1984-5 fiscal year 
the government spent approximately R447 million in sup-
port of various relief programs (c. R. Baard, personal 
communication 1985). During the years 1987- 9 the govern-
ment allocated RI300 million to drought and flood relief 
schemes (Bruwer 1990). Expenditures of this magnitude 
represent a significant expenditure offunds and illustrate the 
serious threats that natural disasters pose to the country. 
In the decades immediately preceding the 1980s, drought 
relief was provided through a phased approach, but only to 
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farmers in those areas officially designated by the govern-
ment (Wilhite 1987). The principal purpose of these assist-
ance programs was to help livestock farmers preserve their 
herds until dry conditions eased. This assistance was 
intended to apply only to extended or disaster droughts, 
although it was often difficult to distinguish between these 
and 'normal' droughts. Assistance provided was generally in 
the form of rebates (phase I) for transportation costs 
incurred in importing livestock feed to the affected area or in 
shipping animals to areas where grass was available. If 
drought conditions continued to deteriorate, loans to pur-
chase livestock feed (phase 2) were then made through the 
Agricultural Credit Board. A continuation of drought con-
ditions brought about the availability of subsidies from the 
government to farmers to help pay for feed (phase 3). One of 
the principal difficulties with this phased approach was that it 
did not encourage farmers to adopt production strategies 
that favored a minimization of risk to the agricultural 
resource base (soil, water and vegetation), an approach more 
in harmony with environmental constraints (Bruwer 1990). 
Indeed, farmers prefer to strive for maximum production, 
regardless of the potential effects on the resource base. 
After 1980, the drought relief scheme was modified, plac-
ing greater emphasis on the preservation of the agricultural 
resource base and the self-sufficiency of livestock farmers to 
endure droughts of other than disaster proportions (Bruwer 
1990). The current approach requires a reduction in stock 
numbers as a prerequisite for eligibility for the forms of relief 
available during a 'disaster' drought. In order to facilitate 
this approach, the country was divided into grazing capacity 
zones. Grazing capacity is defined as the number of hectares 
per livestock unit which can be kept and maintained on the 
natural veld or grassland, as well as planted pastures, crop 
residues and any other fodder produced on the farm. This 
new relief scheme provided for rebates on the transportation 
costs of livestock feed, incentives for stock reduction, loans 
and subsidies for the cost of livestock feeds in order to 
maintain the herd nucleus, and subsidies for finishing stock 
in feedlots . Incentives were in the form of monthly payments 
to farmers and were calculated on a per livestock unit basis. 
Consideration was given to the type of stock (i .e. large versus 
small) in the calculation of incentives. Other types of assist-
ance now available to farmers during droughts include a 
water quota subsidy for irrigators and incentives for convert-
ing marginal cultivated lands to perennial pasture crops in 
both summer and winter rainfall zones. 
To administer the new drought policy and relief scheme an 
institutional structure was established. This structure 
included a National Drought Committee (NDC), with 
multiagency representation, to advise the Minister of Agri-
culture on drought assistance matters and to scrutinize 
applications for assistance from affected areas (Bruwer 
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1989). District Drought Committees (DDC) were also estab-
lished at the local level to consider all applications for the 
designation or revocation of disaster drought areas accord-
ing to the criteria specified by the NDC. The NDC is 
responsible for approving or rejecting these applications. 
The DOC is composed of the magistrate (chair) and rep-
resentatives of the District Farmers' Union, Agricultural 
Credit Committee, Soil Conservation Committee, and the 
Department of Agriculture and Water Supply. 
On the basis of experiences with the new drought 
policy during the 1980s, the government of South Africa is 
convinced that the new relief scheme has contributed sig-
nificantly to sustained agricultural production and develop-
ment, helped to maintain rural communities and infrastruc-
ture, counteracted unemployment, reduced political 
pressure, and increased cooperation between agricultural 
groups and government, thus promoting mutual acceptance 
of responsibility for coping with disasters (Bruwer 1990). 
However, Bruwer has noted some deficiencies and shortcom-
ings of the current system. These include the lack of adequate 
indices to identify disaster droughts, lack of suitable assess-
ment procedures and inadequate monitoring techniques 
(including an improved weather station network). A con-
siderable amount of drought-related research also needs to 
be undertaken, including post-drought audits of past relief 
efforts. 
To assist the DDCs with the evaluation of drought inten-
sity and the determination of eligibility for drought relief, the 
government recently implemented a scheme that provides for 
greater uniformity, objectivity and accuracy in the assess-
ment of drought impact. The main elements evaluated by the 
procedure are climate, veld, pastures and crops, livestock 
and water (Roux 1991). 
The process of developing a better approach to drought 
management in South Africa is not complete. The govern-
ment continues to strive for better ways to reduce the risk of 
drought through proactive measures. According to Bruwer, 
'society is demanding a more rational, cost effective and 
proactive approach' for future drought relief schemes. It is 
essential that this approach reduce the taxpayer's burden and 
provide incentives for diminishing natural resource 
degradation. 
Australia 
The Australian constitution does not delegate specific 
powers covering natural disaster relief to the federal govern-
ment. These powers belong primarily to the states, which, as 
a result, have taken a more active role in drought response 
than state governments in the United States and elsewhere. 
Before 1971, natural disaster relief and restoration was 
provided at a state's request by joint federal /state financing 
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Table 4. Expenditures in Australian states under Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements, by type of disaster , 1970-1 to 1983-
4 ( A$ thousands) 
New 
South South Western Northern 
Wales Victoria Queensland Australia Australia Tasmania Territory Total 
1970-1 3239 15623 
1971- 2 458 3143 
1972-3 
1973-4 987 
1974-5 160 
1975-6 
1976-7 1120 1626 
1977- 8 2620 1228 2785 
1978-9 3013 1422 5165 
1979-80 2208 
1980-1 66810 22768 
1981- 2 31018 9608 
1982-3 53645 34796 51982 
1983-4 21500 8100 63300 
(estimate) 
Total 184570 47172 176582 
Source: National Drought Consultative Committee (1984). 
on a one-to-one cost-sharing basis. No limit was set on the 
level of funding that could be provided by the federal 
government. In 1971 the Natural Disaster Relief Arrange-
ments (NORA) were established, whereby states were 
expected to meet a certain base level or threshold of expendi-
tures for disaster relief from their own resources (Depart-
ment of Primary Industry 1984). Disasters provided for in 
this arrangement are droughts, cyclones, storms, floods and 
bush fires. These expenditure thresholds were set according 
to 1969-70 state budget receipts and therefore varied 
between states. The base levels were raised in 1978 and 1984 
(National Drought Consultative Committee 1984; Keating 
1984). Under the NORA system, the federal government 
agreed to provide full reimbursement of eligible expenditures 
after the thresholds for state expenditures on natural 
disasters were reached. The NORA formalized, for the first 
time, joint federal-state natural disaster relief arrangements. 
At the time of the establishment of NORA, a special set of 
core measures (i.e. federal government-approved drought 
assistance measures) had evolved in each state on the basis of 
30 years of government involvement in disaster relief. These 
measures were particularily relevant to the needs of each 
state because they had been designed by state government in 
response to its own disaster-related experiences. 
Tables 4 and 5 provide data on state and federal expendi-
tures for drought aid from 1970-1 to 1983-4 under the 
NORA. The magnitude of state expenditures is significant, 
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27380 12653 1282 181738 
4600 22100 1900 121500 
57042 101628 4073 571067 
especially when compared with the limited financial respon-
sibility of states in the United States. The total for all states 
was just over A$570 million. Of this total, approximately 
A$180 million was expended during 1982- 3 and A$120 
million during 1983-4. Federal expenditures to the states for 
drought aid under the NORA arrangements (Table 5) were 
just under A$370 million, or about A$200 million less than 
the total state expenditures. The largest share of the assist-
ance was provided to Queensland and New South Wales. 
In addition to the cost-sharing measures described above, 
two federal drought assistance schemes were available 
during the 1982- 3 drought. These were the Drought Relief 
Fodder Subsidy Scheme and the Drought Relief Interest 
Subsidy Scheme (National Drought Consultative Com-
mittee 1984). The Fodder Subsidy Scheme provided a pay-
ment to drought-declared primary producers to help defray 
the cost of fodder for sheep and cattle. The administrative 
costs of this program were covered by the states. The amount 
of the subsidy was based on 50% of the price of feed wheat 
and the nutritive value of the fodder relative to wheat; 
Commonwealth expenditures under this program were 
about A$104 million during 1982- 3 and A$18 million 
through February 1984. 
The Drought Relief Interest Subsidy Scheme provided 
payments to eligible primary producers to cover all interest 
payments exceeding 12% per year. To be eligible, producers 
had to have been drought declared and could not have 
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Table 5. Commonwealth of Australia payments under Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements, estimated by type of disaster, 
1970- 1 to 1983-4 (A$ thousands) 
New 
South South Western Northern 
Wales Victoria Queensland Australia Australia Tasmania Territory Total 
1970-1 450 13632 
1971-2 1502 
1972-3 46 
1973-4 38 
1974-5 114 
1975-6 
1976--7 779 716 
1977-8 1458 399 3091 
1978-9 743 173 2942 
1979-80 -229 1224 
1980-1 42447 14780 
1981-2 14554 5162 
1982-3 32557 22695 37297 
1983-4 11800 4600 45300 
(estimate) 
Total 104940 28354 124976 
Source: National Drought Consultative Committee (1984). 
available financial assets in excess of 12% of the total farm 
debt. Expenditures for the program, not including adminis-
trative costs, were about A$3 million in 1982- 3 and A$23 
million through February 1984. 
The Livestock and Grain Producers Association (LGPA) 
of New South Wales strongly commended the state and 
federal governments of Australia for their drought assistance 
measures. LGPA based its conclusions on the achievement of 
what it considers to be the first priority of drought aid in 
Australia - the preservation of the national sheep and cattle 
herd. Through the preservation of these resources, farm and 
non-farm income was able to recover more quickly than after 
previous episodes of severe drought. LGPA estimated that, 
had government not intervened in 1982- 3, some 15- 20 
million sheep would have been slaughtered. As a result, post-
drought recovery would have been delayed, at a cost to the 
national economy of A$500 million over a 5-year period 
(Anonymous 1983). However, the Australian Agricultural 
Council (1983) concluded, 'With the exception of conces-
sional finance and information, existing policy measures, 
including those introduced during the current (1982- 83) 
drought, do not perform well in achieving the objectives of 
drought policy which it considered important. In summary, 
the nearly $300 million of expenditures was not cost 
effective. ' 
These contrasting views of the cost effectiveness of recent 
drought measures in Australia reflect the recent controversy 
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over state and federal involvement in drought aid. Several 
other studies have been completed (National Farmers' Fede-
ration 1982; South Australian Department of Agriculture 
1983; Stott 1983), each providing recommendations for 
future drought policy. A National Drought Consultative 
Committee (NDCC) was appointed by the Minister for 
Primary Industry in 1984 to review Australian drought 
policy. 
In April 1989 the Commonwealth government decided to 
remove drought from the NDRA scheme described pre-
viously. Following this action, a drought policy review was 
recommended by the Commonwealth in May 1989 under the 
leadership of the Minister for Primary Industries and 
Energy. The objectives of this review (Drought Policy 
Review Task Force 1990) were to (1) identify policy options 
that encourage primary producers and other segments of 
rural Australia to adopt self-reliant approaches to the man-
agement of drought; (2) consider the integration of drought 
policy with other relevant policy issues; and (3) advise on 
priorities for Commonwealth government action in minimiz-
ing the effects of drought in the rural sector. An important 
aspect of this policy review was to examine the extent to 
which the policies of the Commonwealth government pro-
mote more effective farm management given the seasonality 
of climates and climatic variability. The task force concluded 
that the relief measures that have been used in the past have 
not provided a positive incentive for effective farm manage-
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ment or responsible land management. On the contrary, it 
was determined that common misperceptions of drought 
have guided past policies by government, leading to a process 
of crisis management or 'gambling on the weather' by the 
agricultural community (Drought Policy Review Task Force 
1990). 
Several objectives of a newly defined national drought 
policy emerged from the task force review. These objectives 
are to (I) encourage primary producers and other segments 
of rural Australia to adopt self-reliant approaches in manag-
ing for climatic variability; (2) facilitate the maintenance and 
protection of Australia's agricultural and environmental 
resource base during periods of increasing climate stress; and 
(3) facilitate the early recovery of agricultural and rural 
industries consistent with long-term sustainable levels. 
Within this framework, numerous more specific objectives of 
these policies were stated. The primary thrust of this change 
in national policy is from one of crisis management to one of 
risk management. The intent of the task force was to apply 
this approach at two management levels: farm and govern-
ment policy. This integrated approach is the foundation of 
the proposed changes in national policy, changes that have 
met with some resistance. The proposed changes are pre-
sently under review. 
ADVANCING DROUGHT PREPAREDNESS 
IN THE 1990s 
Drought policy versus planning objectives 
Drought planning is defined as actions taken by individual 
citizens, industry, government, and others in advance of 
drought for the purpose of mitigating some of the impacts 
and conflicts associated with its occurrence (Wilhite 1991b). 
From an institutional perspective, a drought preparedness 
plan should include, but is not limited to, the following 
elements: 
(1) A comprehensive, integrated monitoring/early warning 
system to provide decision makers at all levels with infor-
mation about the onset, continuation and termination of 
drought conditions and their severity. 
(2) Operational impact assessment programs to determine 
reliably the likely effects of drought in a timely manner. 
(3) An institutional structure for coordinating governmental 
actions, including information flow within and between 
levels of government, and drought declaration and revo-
cation criteria and procedures. 
(4) Appropriate drought assistance programs (both technical 
and relief) with predetermined eligibility and implemen-
tation criteria. 
(5) Financial resources to maintain operational programs and 
to initiate research required to support drought assessment 
and response activities. 
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(6) Educational and public awareness programs designed to 
promote an understanding and adoption of appropriate 
drought mitigation and water conservation strategies 
among the various economic sectors most affected by 
drought. 
To be successful, drought planning must be integrated 
between levels of government, involving the private sector, 
where appropriate, early in the planning process. As we have 
seen from the discussion presented in the previous section, 
progress has been made by some governments in taking a 
more proactive approach to drought management. For the 
majority of nations, however, much needs to be done. This 
final section of this chapter presents some key factors that 
should be considered by governments attempting to adopt 
the risk management approach in future drought response 
efforts. 
Prior to the development of a drought preparedness plan, 
government officials should formulate a drought policy to 
define what they hope to achieve with that plan (Wilhite 
199Ib). The objectives of a drought policy differ from those 
of a drought plan. There must be a clear distinction of these 
differences at the outset of the planning process. A drought 
policy will be broadly stated and should express the purpose 
of government involvement in drought assessment, mitiga-
tion and assistance programs. Drought plan objectives are 
more specific and action oriented. Typically, the objectives of 
drought policy have not been stated explicitly by govern-
ment. What generally exists in many countries, including the 
United States, is a de Jacto policy, one defined by the most 
pressing needs of the moment. Ironically, under these cir-
cumstances it is the specific instruments of that policy (such 
as assistance measures, including grants and low-interest 
loans, and so forth), particularly at the federal level, that 
define the objectives of the policy. Without clearly stated 
drought policy objectives, the effectiveness of assessment and 
response activities is difficult to evaluate. 
The objectives of drought policy should encourage or 
provide incentives for agricultural producers, municipalities, 
and other water-dependent sectors or groups to adopt appro-
priate and efficient management practices that help to alle-
viate the effects of drought. Past relief measures have, at 
times, discouraged the adoption of appropriate management 
techniques. Assistance should also be provided in an equi-
table, consistent and predictable manner to all without 
regard to economic circumstances, industry or geographic 
region. Assistance can be provided in the form of technical 
aid or relief measures. Whatever the form, those at risk 
would know what to expect from government during 
drought and thus would be better prepared to manage risks. 
At least one objective should also seek to protect the natural 
and agricultural resource base. Degradation of these 
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resources can result in spiralling economic, environmental 
and social costs. 
The objectives of drought policy can be achieved only if 
they are formulated at the initiation of the planning process. 
The entire planning process can then be structured around 
these basic themes. One question that government officials 
must address is the purpose and role of government involve-
ment in drought mitigation efforts. Other questions should 
address the scope of the plan; identification of geographic 
areas, economic sectors and population groups that are most 
at risk; principal environmental concerns; and potential 
human and financial resources to invest in the planning 
process. Answers to these and other questions should help to 
determine the objectives of drought policy and therefore 
provide a focus for the drought planning process. 
Constraints to drought planning 
Institutional, political, budgetary and human resources con-
straints often make drought planning difficult (Wilhite and 
Easterling 1987, 1991). One major constraint that exists 
worldwide is a lack of understanding of drought by politi-
cians, policy makers, technical staff and the general public. 
Lack of communication and cooperation among scientists, 
and inadequate communication between scientists and 
policy makers, on the significance of drought planning, also 
complicate efforts to initiate drought planning. Because 
drought occurs infrequently in some regions, governments 
may ignore the problem or give it low priority. Inadequate 
financial resources to provide assistance and competing 
institutional jurisdictions between and within levels of 
government may also serve to discourage governments from 
undertaking drought planning. Other constraints include 
technological limits such as difficulties in predicting and 
detecting drought, insufficient data bases, and inappropriate 
mitigation technologies. 
Policy makers and bureaucrats should understand that 
droughts, like floods, are a normal feature of climate. Their 
recurrence is inevitable. Drought manifests itself in ways that 
span the jurisdiction of numerous bureaucratic organiza-
tions (e.g. agricultural, water resources, health) and levels of 
government (e.g. federal, state and local). Competing inter-
ests, institutional rivalry and 'turf protection' impede the 
development of concise drought assessment and response 
initiatives. To solve these problems, policy makers and 
bureaucrats, as well as the general public, must be educated 
about the consequences of drought and the advantages of 
preparedness. Drought planning requires input by several 
disciplines, and decision makers must play an integral role in 
this process. 
The development of a drought plan is a positive step that 
demonstrates governmental concern about the effects of a 
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potentially hazardous and recurring phenomenon. Planning, 
if undertaken properly and implemented during non-
drought periods, can improve governmental ability to 
respond in a timely and effective manner during periods of 
crisis. Thus, planning can mitigate and, in some cases, 
prevent some impacts while reducing physical and emotional 
hardship. Planning is a dynamic process that must incorpor-
ate new technologies and take into consideration socioeco-
nomic, agricultural and political trends. 
It is sometimes difficult to determine the benefits of 
drought planning versus the costs of drought. There is little 
doubt that drought preparedness requires financial and 
human resources that are, at times, scarce. This cost has been 
and will continue to be an impediment to the development of 
drought plans. Preparedness costs are fixed and occur now 
while drought costs are uncertain and will occur later. 
Further complicating this issue is the fact that the costs of 
drought are not solely economic. They must also be stated in 
terms of human suffering and the degradation of the physical 
environment, items whose values are inherently difficult to 
estimate. 
Post-drought evaluations have shown assessment and 
response efforts of state and federal governments with a low 
level of preparedness to be largely ineffective, poorly coordi-
nated, untimely and economically inefficient. Unanticipated 
expenditures for drought relief programs are devastating to 
government budgets. For example, during the droughts of 
the mid-1970s in the United States, specifically 1974, 1976 
and 1977, the federal government spent more than $7 billion 
on drought relief programs. As a result of the drought of 
1988, the federal government spent $3.9 billion on drought 
relief programs and $2.5 billion on farm credit programs. A 
disaster relief package was also passed by the US Congress in 
August 1989 in response to a continuation of drought 
conditions. Between 1970 and 1984, state and federal govern-
ment in Australia expended more than A$925 million on 
drought relief under the Natural Disaster Relief Arrange-
ments. The Republic of South Africa has spent R2.5 billion 
on drought relief in the past decade. When compared with 
these expenditures, a small investment in mitigation pro-
grams in advance of drought would seem to be a sound 
economic decision. In developing countries, droughts devas-
tate regional and national economies and significantly hinder 
the development process. 
It is important to remind decision makers and policy 
officials that, in most instances, drought planning efforts will 
use existing political and institutional structures at appropri-
ate levels of government, thus minimizing start-up and 
maintenance costs. It is also quite likely that some savings 
may be realized as a result of improved coordination and the 
elimination of some duplication of effort. Also, drought 
plans should be incorporated into general natural disaster 
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and/or water management plans wherever possible. This 
would reduce the cost of drought preparedness substantially. 
Politicians and many other decision makers must simply be 
better informed about drought, its impacts, and alternative 
management approaches and how existing information and 
technology can be used more effectively to reduce the impact 
of drought at a relatively modest cost. 
The development of a drought policy and plan: the ten-
step process 
A planning process was developed recently in the United 
States in order to facilitate the preparation of drought 
contingency plans by state government decision makers 
(Wilhite 1990, 1991). The proposed process is intended to 
assist government decision makers in improving drought 
mitigation efforts through more timely, effective and efficient 
assessment and response activities. The framework below 
presents the principal steps in the planning process in order 
for government to address its drought-related concerns. 
However, the process is intended to be flexible (i.e. govern-
ments can add, delete or modify steps as necessary). 
The intent here is not to present a detailed discussion of 
each of these steps. What is included is a very brief descrip-
tion of the purpose and elements of each step as these relate 
to the overall planning process. This process must be modi-
fied or adapted to each region, adding or deleting steps as 
appropriate. 
Step 1. Appointment oJnational/state drought taskJorce or 
committee 
The drought task force (DTF) or committee should be 
appointed by the president, governor or designated govern-
ment official and include representatives from all relevant 
agencies of government. This task force will be composed of 
senior policy makers. 
The DTF has two purposes. First, during plan develop-
ment, the DTF will supervise and coordinate the develop-
ment of the plan. Second, after the plan is implemented and 
during times of drought when the plan is activated, the DTF 
will assume the role of policy coordinator - reviewing and 
recommending alternative policy response options to the 
appropriate policy official. The makeup of the DTF should 
recognize the multidisciplinary nature of drought and its 
impacts and include representatives of both state and federal 
government. The DTF should consider including a represen-
tative of the media or a public information specialist in an 
advisory capacity so that the proper mechanisms are incor-
porated into the plan to ensure public awareness of drought 
severity and the actions implemented by government. 
Environmental and public interest groups may also be 
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included on the DTF, or they may serve in an advisory 
capacity. The actual makeup of the task force is expected to 
be highly variable between states or countries, reflecting the 
variety of economic sectors affected and political infrastruc-
ture. Membership should be kept relatively small so that size 
does not become an impediment to the planning process. 
What is envisioned is the development of an infrastructure 
that can not only assess and respond to short-term reduc-
tions in water supply due to drought, but also can address 
questions of changes in vulnerability in the long term. 
Step 2. Statement oj drought policy and planning objectives 
The first official action of the DTF will be the determination 
of a drought policy. This policy will lead to the development 
of a general statement of purpose for the drought plan. 
A general statement of purpose for a drought plan could 
be to provide an effective and systematic means of assessing 
and responding to drought conditions. The DTF then must 
identify specific objectives of the plan. Drought plan objec-
tives and their applications will vary between countries or 
states, reflecting the unique physical, environmental, socio-
economic and political characteristics of each location. Some 
objectives that might be considered include: 
(1) To provide timely and systematic data collection, analysis 
and dissemination of drought-related information. 
(2) To establish proper criteria to identify and designate 
drought-affected areas of the state and to trigger the 
initiation and termination of various assessment and res-
ponse activities by governmental agencies during drought 
emergencies. 
(3) To provide an organizational structure that assures infor-
mation flow between and within levels of government and 
defines the duties and responsibilities of all agencies with 
respect to drought. To ensure adequate coordination 
between the federal and state governments, this structure 
should be integrated with national drought policies (if they 
exist). 
(4) To maintain a current inventory of assistance programs 
used in assessing and responding to drought emergencies 
and provide a set of appropriate action recommendations. 
(5) To provide a mechanism to assure the timely and accurate 
assessment of drought impact on agriculture, industry, 
municipalities, wildlife, health, and other areas as 
appropriate. 
(6) To provide accurate and timely information to the media in 
order to keep the public informed of current conditions and 
response actions. 
(7) To establish and pursue a strategy to remove obstacles to 
the equitable allocation of water during shortages and to 
provide incentives to encourage water conservation. 
(8) To establish a set of procedures to evaluate and revise the 
plan on a continuous basis in order to keep the plan 
responsive to the needs of the state. 
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Step 3. Resolving conflict between environmental and 
economic sectors 
Political, social and economic values often clash during 
drought conditions as competition for scarce water resources 
intensifies, and it may be difficult to achieve compromises. To 
reduce the risk of conflict between water users during periods 
of shortage, it is essential for the public to receive a balanced 
interpretation of changing conditions through the media. 
The DTF should ensure that frequent, thorough and accur-
ate news releases are issued to explain changing conditions 
and complex problem areas. To lessen conflict and develop 
satisfactory solutions, it is essential that the views of citizens 
and public and environmental interest groups be considered 
in the drought planning process at an early stage. Although 
the level of involvement of these groups will no doubt vary 
notably, the power of public interest groups in policy making 
is considerable. Public interest organizations have initiated 
and participated in the development of natural resource 
policies and plans for some time and have considerable 
experience with this process. The involvement of these 
groups in determining appropriate policy goals strengthens 
the overall policy and plan. Moreover, this involvement 
assures that the diverse values of society are adequately 
represented in the policy and plan. 
Step 4. In ventory o/natural, biological, and human resources 
andfinancial and legal constraints 
The DTF should undertake an inventory of natural, biologi-
cal and human resources, including the identification of 
financial and legal constraints. Resources include, for exam-
ple, natural and biological resources, human expertise, 
infrastructure, and capital available to government. Finan-
cial constraints include costs of hauling water or hay, new 
program or data collection costs, and so forth; legal con-
straints include user water rights, existing public trust laws, 
methods available to control usage, requirements for con-
tingency plans for water suppliers, and emergency and other 
powers of the government during water shortages. An inven-
tory of these resources would reveal assets and liabilities that 
might have an effect on the planning process; in addition, a 
comprehensive assessment of available resources would 
provide the information necessary for further action by the 
task force . 
Step 5. Development 0/ the drought plan 
The DTF will be the coordinating body for the development 
of a drought plan. The plan is envisioned to follow a stepwise 
or phased approach as water conditions deteriorate and 
more stringent actions are needed. Thresholds must be 
established such that, when exceeded, certain actions are 
triggered within government agencies, as defined by the 
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Figure 2: Linkages and suggested organizational components of 
the drought plan. 
structure of the plan. A flow chart illustrating these linkages 
and the suggested components of the drought plan is shown 
in Fig. 2. 
A drought plan possesses three essential elements: moni-
toring, impact assessment and response. These elements are 
the basis for three committees: (I) Water Availability and 
Outlook Committee (W AOC); (2) Impact Assessment Com-
mittee (lAC); and (3) Drought Response Committee or 
Drought Task Force (DTF). Although each committee has 
its own distinct activities, formal linkages will need to be 
incorporated in the plan for the committees to function 
properly and be responsive to state needs and changing 
conditions. The W AOC's activities would include defining 
drought and developing triggers, identifying drought man-
agement areas, developing a monitoring system for drought, 
completing an inventory of observation networks, determin-
ing primary users and their needs, and developing data and 
information delivery systems. Membership of the committee 
should include representatives from agencies with responsi-
bilities for forecasting and monitoring the principal indi-
cators of the water balance. 
During periods of drought, impacts will be far-reaching 
and cut across economic sectors and the responsibilities of 
government agencies. The lAC will represent those economic 
sectors most likely to be affected by drought. The lAC 
chairperson should be a permanent member of the DTF; the 
rest of the committee should consist of an interagency team 
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of agency heads or their representatives. The lAC should exercises should be carried out periodicaliy following imple-
consider both direct and indirect losses resulting from mentation. It is also suggested that announcement and 
drought, since its effects ripple through the economy. implementation occur just before the most drought-sensitive 
Because of the obvious dependency of the lAC on the season to take advantage of inherent public interest. 
WAOC, frequent communication is essential. What is 
recommended is a series of working groups responsible for 
anticipating and identifying drought-related impacts in each 
economic sector. The responsibility of the lAC is to coordi-
nate the activities of each of the working groups and make 
policy response recommendations to the DTF. 
A drought response committee comprising senior-level 
officials will act on the information and recommendations of 
the lAC and evaluate the state and federal programs avail-
able to assist agricultural producers, municipalities, and 
others during times of emergency. The makeup of this 
committee is envisioned to be roughly the same as that of the 
DTF. Therefore, for maximum efficiency the DTF can 
assume this function once the plan has been developed and 
fully implemented. The DTF will present its recommenda-
tions to the governor. 
During the plan development process, the DTF should 
make an inventory of all forms of assistance available from 
government during severe drought and evaluate these pro-
grams for their ability to address short-term emergency 
Step 9. Development of multilevel educational and training 
programs 
Educational and training programs must be long term in 
design, concentrating on a broad audience ranging from 
policy makers to extension personnel to individual citizens. 
Educational and training programs should emphasize 
several points. First, a greater level of understanding must be 
established to heighten public awareness of drought and 
water conservation and the ways in which individual citizens, 
industry and government can help to mitigate impacts in the 
short run. This educational process might begin with the 
development of a media awareness program. Second, the 
DTF should initiate an information program aimed at 
educating the general population about drought and 
drought management and what they can do as individuals to 
conserve water in the short run. Educational programs must 
be long term in design, concentrating on achieving a better 
understanding of water conservation issues among elemen-
tary school children. If such programs are not developed, 
situations and as long-term mitigation programs to reduce governmental and public interest in and support for drought 
vulnerability to drought. The DTF should also be aware of planning will wane during periods of non-drought con-
the proper protocol for requesting federal assistance. 
Step 6. Identification of research needs and institutional gaps 
The purpose of this step is to identify research needed in 
support of the objectives of the drought plan and to recom-
mend research necessary to remove deficiencies that may 
exist. The research needs and institutional gaps will be 
identified by the monitoring, impact assessment and res-
ponse committees. These committees will make recommen-
dations to the national/state drought committee for further 
action. 
Step 7. Synthesis of scientific and policy issues 
Direct and extensive contact is required between scientists 
and policy makers to distinguish what is feasible from what is 
desirable. Typically little contact occurs between these two 
groups. The purpose of this step is to identify ways to break 
down the barriers that exist between disciplines and between 
scientists and policy makers. 
Step 8. Implementation of the drought plan 
The drought plan should be implemented by the DTF to give 
maximum visibility to the program and credit to the agencies 
and organizations that have a leadership or supporting role 
in its operation. The plan should be tested under simulated 
drought conditions before it is implemented, and simulation 
ditions. 
Step 10. Development of drought plan evaluation procedures 
The drought plan must be evaluated and revised periodically 
to remain responsive to the needs of each country. Two 
modes of evaluation are recommended. The first is a contin-
uous (every 1- 2 years) evaluation and revision to adjust the 
plan in light of political, economic, technological and social 
changes. This mode of evaluation is intended to express 
drought planning as a dynamic process, rather than a 
discrete event. The evaluation process is proposed to keep the 
drought assessment and response system current and respon-
sive to the needs of society. Following the initial establish-
ment of the plan, it should be monitored routinely to ensure 
that societal changes that may affect water supply and/or 
demand or regulatory practices are considered for incor-
poration. 
The second mode of evaluation follows an episode of 
severe drought in which the plan was activated. A post-
drought evaluation of the plan should be undertaken by a 
non-governmental organization to assure an unbiased 
appraisal of the assessment and response actions. Institu-
tional memory fades quickly following drought as a result of 
changes in political administration, natural attrition of 
persons in primary leadership positions, and the destruction 
of critical documentation of events and actions taken. 
8 REDUCING THE IMPACTS OF DROUGHT 
CONCLUSION 
Post-drought audits of government response to drought 
have demonstrated that the reactive or crisis management 
approach has led to ineffective, poorly coordinated and 
untimely responses. Also, the magnitude of economic, social 
and environmental losses in recent years has illustrated the 
vulnerability of all nations, developed and developing, to 
extended episodes of severe drought. Increased awareness 
and understanding of drought have led many governments to 
take a more proactive approach toward drought manage-
ment, thus attempting to reduce impacts in the short term 
and vulnerability in the long term. This approach promotes 
the concept of increased harmony between government 
policy, land management practices and environmental con-
straints, leading to more sustainable agricultural production. 
This chapter documents some of the recent progress that 
has been made in the United States, South Africa and 
Australia in drought mitigation. In each case, this progress is 
the direct result of a fundamental philosophical change by 
government. The development of drought policies that pro-
mote risk management rather than crisis management and 
the preparation of contingency plans represent a proactive 
step toward risk minimization and vulnerability reduction. 
Drought contingency plans promote greater coordination 
within and between levels of government, improve pro-
cedures for monitoring, assessing and responding to severe 
water shortages, and facilitate more efficient utilization of 
natural, financial and human resources. 
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